

Foundations of Social Theory

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Contents

Preface	xv
1. Metatheory: Explanation in Social Science	1
Explanation of the Behavior of Social Systems	2
Components of the Theory	11
Conceptions of the Relations between Micro and Macro Levels	21
 <i>Part I / Elementary Actions and Relations</i>	
2. Actors and Resources, Interest and Control	27
The Elements	28
Structures of Action	34
Social Exchange	37
Simple and Complex Relations	43
3. Rights to Act	45
What Are Rights?	49
How the Free-Rider Problem Is Reduced for Rights	53
How Does New Information Bring About a Change in the Allocation of Rights?	54
How Does a Right Change Hands?	57
Who Are the Relevant Others?	58
How Are Rights Partitioned, and How Might They Be?	59
4. Authority Relations	65
The Right to Control One's Own Actions	67
Vesting of Authority	69
Conjoint and Disjoint Authority Relations	72
Transfer of One Right or Two: Simple and Complex Authority Relations	81
Limitations on Authority	82
Slavery	86
Authority without Intentional Exercise	88

5. Relations of Trust	91
The Placement of Trust	97
Actions of the Trustee	108
Multiple Trustors and Public-Goods Problems	115

Part II / Structures of Action

6. Systems of Social Exchange	119
What Is Money?	119
Media of Exchange in Social and Political Systems	124
Exchanges within Systems	131
7. From Authority Relations to Authority Systems	145
The Law of Agency	146
Sympathy and Identification: Affine Agents	157
Simple and Complex Authority Structures	162
The Internal Morality of an Authority System	172
8. Systems of Trust and Their Dynamic Properties	175
Mutual Trust	177
Intermediaries in Trust	180
Third-Party Trust	186
Large Systems Involving Trust	188
9. Collective Behavior	197
General Properties of Collective Behavior	198
Escape Panics	203
Bank and Stock Market Panics	215
Acquisitive Crazes	218
Contagious Beliefs	219
Hostile and Expressive Crowds	220
Fads and Fashions	230
Influence Processes in Purchasing Decisions, Voting, and Public Opinion	237
Specific Predictions about Collective Behavior	239
10. The Demand for Effective Norms	241
Examples of Norms and Sanctions	245
Distinctions among Norms	246
The First Condition: Externalities of Actions and the Demand for a Norm	249
What Constitutes Social Efficiency?	260
Systems of Norms	265

11. The Realization of Effective Norms	266
An Action-Rights Bank	267
Social Relationships in Support of Sanctions	269
Free Riding and Zeal	273
Heroic versus Incremental Sanctioning	278
How Are Sanctions Applied in Society?	282
Emergence of Norms about Voting	289
Internalization of Norms	292
12. Social Capital	300
Human Capital and Social Capital	304
Forms of Social Capital	304
Relative Quantities of Social Capital	313
The Public-Good Aspect of Social Capital	315
The Creation, Maintenance, and Destruction of Social Capital	318
<i>Part III / Corporate Action</i>	
13. Constitutions and the Construction of Corporate Actors	325
Norms and Constitutions	325
Positive Social Theory	344
Change in a Disjoint Constitution: American High Schools	349
An Optimal Constitution	352
Who Are the Elementary Actors?	367
14. The Problem of Social Choice	371
Partitioning of Rights to Indivisible Goods	371
Constitutional Issues in Partitioning Rights to Control Corporate Actions	374
Intellectual Puzzles concerning Social Choice	376
Emergent Processes and Institutions for Social Choice	381
Ethical Theory: How to Determine the Right Action	384
Executive Decision Making	387
Community Decision Making and Conflict	390
Characteristics of Noninstitutionalized Social Choice	394
15. From Individual Choice to Social Choice	397
The Problem of Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives	398
Tournaments as Institutions for Social Choice	403
Multi-Stage versus Single-Stage Processes for Social Choice	405
The Nature of Rights in Social Choice	414

16. The Corporate Actor as a System of Action	421
Weberian Bureaucracy in Theory and Practice	422
The Formal Organization as a Specification of Transactions	425
Modes of Maintaining Viability in Formal Organizations	426
Explicit and Implicit Constitutions	435
Structures That Link Interest and Control	442
General Principles for Optimizing the Corporate Actor's Internal Structure	446
The Changing Conception of the Corporation	448
17. Rights and Corporate Actors	451
Allocation of Corporate Rights and the Public-Goods Problem	451
Exercise and Exchange of Rights	452
The Drift of Power toward Actors Having Usage Rights	456
Withdrawal of Usage Rights through Voice and Exit	463
18. Revoking Authority	466
Theories of Revolution	468
Comparative Macrosocial Research: Inequality, Economic Development, and Repressiveness	486
Ideology in Revolutions	487
A Theoretical Framework of Revolution	489
19. The Self	503
Problems Inherent in a Unitary Actor	504
Functional Components of the Self	507
The Dual Role of Interests	509
Processes of Change inside the Actor	515
Corporate Actors' Changes in Self	527

Part IV / Modern Society

20. Natural Persons and the New Corporate Actors	531
Individual Sovereignty	531
Changing Conceptions of Sovereignty	532
Emergence of Corporate Actors in Social Organization and Law	534
Examples of Interactions of Natural Persons and Corporate Actors	542
Types of Interactions Involving Corporate Actors and Persons	546
Displacement of Nature by Human Constructions	552
21. Responsibility of Corporate Actors	553
Responsible Actions of Natural Persons	556
Social Origins of Corporate Responsibility	558

Internal Changes and Corporate Responsibility	560
Tax Laws and Social Norms	573
Free-Rider Problems for Corporate Responsibility	574
Corporate Responsibility in Sum	575
What Conception of the Corporation Is Best for Natural Persons?	577
22. New Generations in the New Social Structure	579
The Conflict between the Family and the Corporation	579
Distribution of Income to Children in the New Social Structure	587
Consequences of the New Social Structure for Social Capital	590
The Direct Impact of the Two Social Structures on the Next Generation	597
23. The Relation of Sociology to Social Action in the New Social Structure	610
The Social Role of Social Theory	611
The World of Action and the World of the Discipline	615
The Structure of Society and the Nature of Applied Social Research	616
Applied Social Research and the Theory of Action	626
What Should Applied Social Research Be Like?	645
What Research Is Missing?	647
24. The New Social Structure and the New Social Science	650
The Replacement of Primordial Social Capital	652
Independent Viability, Global Viability, and Distribution in the New Social Structure	655
Modes of Organizing Action	658
Nation-States versus Multinational Corporations, or Voice versus Exit	660
The New Social Science	663
 <i>Part V / The Mathematics of Social Action</i> 	
25. The Linear System of Action	667
Two-Person Exchange System with Divisible Goods	670
Restrictions on the Utility Function	674
Beyond a Two-Person System of Action	680
The Competitive Equilibrium and the Linear System of Action	681
Further Derivations and Use of the Model	687
Economic and Psychological Properties of the Utility Function	693
Open Systems	695
Appendix: An Iterative Method for Solving for r or v Given X and C	698

26. Empirical Applications	701
Estimation of Value with Perfect-Market Assumptions	702
Estimation of Value When There Are Two Resources and More Than Two Actors	703
Estimation of Value When There Are More Than Two Resources	709
Arbitrary Zero Points for Resources	711
Sampling and the Importance of the Population and Resource Distributions	715
Estimation of Interests	717
27. Extensions of the Theory	719
A Perfect Social System	719
Psychic Investment	721
Dependence of Events	722
Partitioned Systems of Action	725
Losses in Exchange between Actors and between Resources	729
28. Trust in a Linear System of Action	747
Introducing Mistrust into a System	750
Lack of Complete Trust in Larger Systems	756
29. Power, the Micro-to-Macro Transition, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility	769
Interpersonal Comparison	769
Cardinal Utility	778
Power, through a Market and Otherwise	781
30. Externalities and Norms in a Linear System of Action	785
When Will Actions Having Externalities Be Taken? The Coase Theorem Revisited	787
Externalities and Level of Affluence	796
What Is Meant by Efficiency?	799
The Rationality of Norms	800
31. Indivisible Events, Corporate Actors, and Collective Decisions	829
When Will Control of Events Be Collectivized?	829
The Constitutional Stage	830
The Postconstitutional Stage	844
Social Choice by Various Decision Rules	856
Conflict	869

32. Dynamics of the Linear System of Action	874
Exchange with Two Actors and Two Resources	875
Change in Resources Held by One Actor	878
Movement of a Resource among Actors	885
Logical Constraints on Transition Rates in Pairwise Exchange Systems	887
A Description of the Path of Values: Walrasian Adjustment	889
Dynamics of Systems with Social-Structural Barriers	892
How Do Power of Actors and Values of Events Change?	895
33. Unstable and Transient Systems of Action	899
Single-Contingency and Double-Contingency Collective Behavior	901
Transfer of Control in Single-Contingency Panics	903
Double-Contingency Panics	911
Evolution of Strategies	931
34. The Internal Structure of Actors	932
Event Outcomes as Actions of a Corporate Actor	933
Corporate Outcomes and Public-Good Problems	937
The Value of Resources and the Interests of a Corporate Actor	939
Subjective and Objective Interests of a Corporate Actor	941
The Internal Structure of Persons as Actors	946
References	951
Name Index	973
Subject Index	979