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Re-designing the Admissibility
Model of the European Court
of Human Rights

Table of contents

Preface	V
Outline	VII
Table of contents	IX
Acknowledgements	XIII
Table of cases before the ECtHR	XV
Table of legislation	XXXIII
Table of abbreviations	XXXVII
Notes on citation	XXXIX
Part 1: Introduction and methods	1
§ 1 Introductory remarks: Challenges to the ECtHR’s legitimacy	3
I. Authoritativeness of the ECtHR	4
II. Structural imbalance between input and output	9
III. Non-principled interpretation of admissibility criteria	13
IV. Conclusion	20
§ 2 Research parameters	23
I. Aim: establishing reliable expectations	23
II. Structure	25
III. Fundamentals	27
1. Definition of terms	27
2. Research gap	34
3. Selecting constitutional complaint mechanisms	38
4. Conclusion	45
IV. Methodology	46
1. Comparative legal analysis	46
2. Interpretivist understanding of jurisprudence	49
3. Conclusion	53

Part 2: Conceptions of justice in theory and in practice.....55

§ 3 Conceptions of justice underlying constitutional complaints 57

- I. Conceptualising the two main theories of justice57
 - 1. Communitarian justice: serving community values.....58
 - 2. Egalitarian justice: accentuating formal equality63
 - 3. Collective vs. individual rationality65
- II. The ECtHR’s current conception of justice.....67
 - 1. Theory: dual mission.....67
 - 2. Practice: indecisive implementation.....73
- III. Communitarian egalitarianism as the way forward83
 - 1. Status quo of the future role83
 - 2. Combining communitarian and egalitarian justice85
- IV. Conclusion95

§ 4 Seven admissibility models of constitutional complaints..... 99

- I. General nature of researched constitutional courts.....100
- II. Justifications for formal admissibility criteria105
 - 1. Similar wordings105
 - 1.1 Wordings of formalities.....106
 - 1.2 Wordings of procedural grounds109
 - 1.3 Wordings of jurisdictional grounds111
 - 1.4 Conclusion.....113
 - 2. Diverging jurisprudential interpretations.....114
 - 2.1 Interpretations of formalities114
 - 2.2 Interpretations of procedural grounds.....123
 - 2.3 Interpretations of jurisdictional grounds.....136
 - 2.4 Conclusion.....150
 - 3. Partly contradicting justifications.....151
 - 3.1 Justifications for formalities151
 - 3.2 Justifications for procedural grounds155
 - 3.3 Justifications for jurisdictional grounds.....162
 - 3.4 Conclusion.....165
- III. Justifications for substantial admissibility criteria167
 - 1. Vague wordings.....168
 - 1.1 Wordings of the individual dimension of the case.....168
 - 1.2 Wordings of the general dimension of the case169

1.3 Conclusion.....	170
2. Expansive jurisprudential interpretations	171
2.1 Interpretations of the individual dimension of the case	171
2.2 Interpretations of the general dimension of the case	182
2.3 Conclusion.....	186
3. Pragmatic justifications	187
3.1 Justifications for the individual dimension of the case	188
3.2 Justifications for the general dimension of the case	193
3.3 Conclusion.....	196
IV. Conclusion	197

Part 3: Evaluating and re-designing the ECtHR's admissibility model 201

§ 5 Evaluating admissibility models of constitutional complaints.....	203
I. Structural benchmark: scope of discretion	203
II. Substantial benchmark: reliable expectations.....	207
1. Reliable expectations and admissibility	207
2. Conceptual application: unity and clarity	211
3. Pragmatic application: workload management.....	216
III. Assessing admissibility under benchmarks	218
1. Scope of discretion	218
2. Reliable expectations of varying degree.....	223
IV. Conclusion	230

§ 6 Re-designing the ECtHR's admissibility model.....	233
I. Preliminary constraints.....	234
II. Formal admissibility under communitarian egalitarianism	238
1. Formalities: lowering thresholds for laypersons.....	239
2. Procedural grounds: expanding redundancy and abuse	250
3. Jurisdictional grounds: reducing exceptions.....	266
III. Substantial admissibility under communitarian egalitarianism	272
1. No significant disadvantage: adjustable monetary threshold.....	274
2. Manifestly ill-founded: at most every fifth case	282
IV. Exceptions from compliance	294
1. Formal admissibility: grave individual importance	294

Part 2: Conceptions of justice in theory and in practice..... 55

§ 3 Conceptions of justice underlying constitutional complaints 57

I.	Conceptualising the two main theories of justice	57
1.	Communitarian justice: serving community values.....	58
2.	Egalitarian justice: accentuating formal equality	63
3.	Collective vs. individual rationality	65
II.	The ECtHR's current conception of justice.....	67
1.	Theory: dual mission.....	67
2.	Practice: indecisive implementation.....	73
III.	Communitarian egalitarianism as the way forward	83
1.	Status quo of the future role	83
2.	Combining communitarian and egalitarian justice	85
IV.	Conclusion	95

§ 4 Seven admissibility models of constitutional complaints..... 99

I.	General nature of researched constitutional courts.....	100
II.	Justifications for formal admissibility criteria.....	105
1.	Similar wordings	105
1.1	Wordings of formalities.....	106
1.2	Wordings of procedural grounds	109
1.3	Wordings of jurisdictional grounds	111
1.4	Conclusion.....	113
2.	Diverging jurisprudential interpretations.....	114
2.1	Interpretations of formalities	114
2.2	Interpretations of procedural grounds.....	123
2.3	Interpretations of jurisdictional grounds.....	136
2.4	Conclusion.....	150
3.	Partly contradicting justifications.....	151
3.1	Justifications for formalities	151
3.2	Justifications for procedural grounds	155
3.3	Justifications for jurisdictional grounds.....	162
3.4	Conclusion.....	165
III.	Justifications for substantial admissibility criteria	167
1.	Vague wordings.....	168
1.1	Wordings of the individual dimension of the case.....	168
1.2	Wordings of the general dimension of the case.....	169

1.3 Conclusion.....	170
2. Expansive jurisprudential interpretations	171
2.1 Interpretations of the individual dimension of the case	171
2.2 Interpretations of the general dimension of the case	182
2.3 Conclusion.....	186
3. Pragmatic justifications	187
3.1 Justifications for the individual dimension of the case	188
3.2 Justifications for the general dimension of the case	193
3.3 Conclusion.....	196
IV. Conclusion	197

Part 3: Evaluating and re-designing the ECtHR's admissibility model 201

§ 5 Evaluating admissibility models of constitutional complaints..... 203

I. Structural benchmark: scope of discretion	203
II. Substantial benchmark: reliable expectations.....	207
1. Reliable expectations and admissibility	207
2. Conceptual application: unity and clarity.....	211
3. Pragmatic application: workload management.....	216
III. Assessing admissibility under benchmarks	218
1. Scope of discretion	218
2. Reliable expectations of varying degree.....	223
IV. Conclusion	230

§ 6 Re-designing the ECtHR's admissibility model..... 233

I. Preliminary constraints.....	234
II. Formal admissibility under communitarian egalitarianism	238
1. Formalities: lowering thresholds for laypersons.....	239
2. Procedural grounds: expanding redundancy and abuse.....	250
3. Jurisdictional grounds: reducing exceptions.....	266
III. Substantial admissibility under communitarian egalitarianism	272
1. No significant disadvantage: adjustable monetary threshold.....	274
2. Manifestly ill-founded: at most every fifth case.....	282
IV. Exceptions from compliance	294
1. Formal admissibility: grave individual importance	294

Table of contents

2. Substantial admissibility: systemic problems.....	296
V. Conclusion	299
§ 7 Concluding remarks	309
I. Findings on re-designing the ECtHR’s admissibility model	309
II. Fields for further research	321
Bibliography.....	323
Interview methodology and partners.....	387
Curriculum vitae.....	391