

**Völkerstrafrecht und
internationales Strafrecht**

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**Secondary Liability in
International Criminal Law**

A Study on Aiding and Abetting or
otherwise Assisting the Commission of
International Crimes

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	V
Table of Abbreviations and Acronyms	XII
Bibliography	219
Table of cases	235
A. Introduction	1
I. Scope and outline of the study	1
II. The notion of aiding and abetting	2
1. Aiding and abetting defined	2
2. Abetting compared to instigation and incitement	4
3. Preliminary remarks on terminology	5
3.1. The terms accomplice liability and complicity	5
3.2. Principal, secondary and accessory liability vs. aiding and abetting	7
III. Attribution of liability for aiding and abetting in criminal law	9
1. The distinction between principal and accessory liability	9
1.1. Participation models	9
1.2. The modalities of the distinction	11
IV. The nature of and the rationale for criminalising accessory liability	14
1. Non-derivative theories	14
2. Derivative theories	15
2.1. Causal and non-causal theories	16
2.2. The influence of causality	18
3. The extent of dependence	20
V. Limiting the scope of aiding and abetting	21
B. The International Military Tribunals and allied proceedings in the German zones of occupation	23
I. Charter and judgment of the International Military Tribunal	23
1. Enactment and wording of the Charter	23
2. Aiding and abetting at Nuremberg?	25
3. The subsequent formulation of the Nuremberg Principles	28
II. Charter and judgment of the IMTFE	30
1. Enactment of the Charter	30
2. Modes of liability in the Tokyo Charter	31
3. Accessory liability as expressed in the judgment	33

III. Military Commissions and Courts in occupied Germany	36
1. Introduction	36
2. Control Council Law No. 10	37
2.1. System of participation and aiding and abetting	37
2.2. Extended forms of complicity in subparagraphs (c) and (d)	40
2.3. Conclusion on Control Council Law No. 10	42
IV. The case law of the military tribunals in the zones of occupation	43
1. American military tribunals on aiding and abetting	43
1.1. The <i>Flick</i> case in particular	47
1.1.1. Facts of the case	47
1.1.2. The approach taken by the prosecution	47
1.1.3. The judgment	50
1.2. Financial support charged in the <i>Ministries</i> case	52
1.3. Conclusion on the American case law	54
2. The British military tribunals on aiding and abetting	56
2.1. General remarks	56
2.2. The <i>Zyklon B</i> case in particular	57
2.2.1. Facts of the case	57
2.2.2. The judgment	58
2.3. Conclusion on the British case law, with particular reference to <i>Zyklon B</i>	59
3. The French military tribunals on aiding and abetting	60
3.1. Preliminary remarks on terminology and the law applied	60
3.2. Complicity, complicité and aiding and abetting in French case law	60
3.3. Hermann Roechling and Others in particular	63
3.3.1. Facts of the case	63
3.3.2. The judgments of the tribunals of first and second instance	64
3.4. Conclusion on French case law, particularly <i>Roechling and Others</i>	66
V. Summary and conclusion	68
C. Aiding and abetting in the ambit of the <i>ad hoc</i> tribunals	77
I. The <i>actus reus</i> elements of aiding and abetting	77
1. The substantial effect requirement	78
1.1. In <i>Tadić</i>	78

1.2.	In <i>Furundžija</i>	80
1.2.1.	<i>Furundžija</i> 's methodology	80
1.2.2.	<i>Furundžija</i> 's problematic interpretation of the <i>Einsatzgruppen</i> case	81
1.3.	The tests applied by the <i>ad hoc</i> tribunals	84
1.3.1.	The encouragement by mere presence test in <i>Tadić</i>	85
1.3.2.	The encouragement by authority test in <i>Akayesu</i> , <i>Aleksovski</i> and <i>Furundžija</i>	87
1.3.3.	The efficiency test in <i>Kvočka</i> and <i>Orić</i>	90
1.3.4.	The substantially-less-likely-test in <i>Mrkšić</i> and <i>Popović</i>	91
1.3.5.	The quantitative test in <i>Perisić</i> , <i>Krstić</i> and <i>Blagojević</i> and <i>Jokić</i>	93
1.3.6.	A conclusion on the variety of the tests applied	94
1.4.	The interplay between substantial effect and causality	98
1.5.	Conclusion on substantial effect	103
2.	The direct effect requirement	104
2.1.	The introduction of direct effect in <i>Tadić</i>	104
2.2.	Direct effect subsequent to <i>Tadić</i>	107
2.3.	A new perspective on direct effect	109
2.4.	Conclusion on the direct effect requirement	113
II.	The <i>mens rea</i> elements	113
1.	A knowledge-based <i>mens rea</i> threshold	114
1.1.	The cognitive-volitional knowledge standard	114
1.2.	The knowledge only threshold	116
1.3.	The two thresholds are compatible and depend on the understanding of intent	118
1.4.	Preliminary conclusion	120
2.	The contours of knowledge	121
2.1.	Knowledge of the crime or of the act of participation, or both?	121
2.1.1.	Interchangeable use of both points of reference	121
2.1.2.	A double knowledge standard	123
2.2.	Extent and degree of knowledge	124
2.2.1.	Of the crime	124
2.2.2.	Of the act of participation: <i>Dolus eventualis</i> ?	125
3.	A purpose-based <i>mens rea</i> standard for aiding and abetting?	127
3.1.	In general	127
3.2.	For special intent crimes	130
4.	Summary and conclusion on the <i>mens rea</i> elements	134

III. Aiding and abetting within the system of participation	136
1. The system of participation in the Statutes	136
2. The participation model according to early case law	137
3. Towards a differentiating participation model	139
4. From an objective to a “subjective” approach	141
4.1. The objective approach in early case law	141
4.2. The emergence of a “subjective” approach	142
5. Two problems with shared intent	144
5.1. The fine line between knowledge and shared intent	144
5.2. Distinguishing JCE III from aiding and abetting	147
6. Objective criteria to complement shared intent?	150
6.1. Does the common criminal plan make for a reliable criterion?	152
6.2. Harmonisation through other approaches?	154
6.2.1. Formal-objective approach minus punishment discount	154
6.2.2. Gesamttatmodell	154
6.2.3. Control of the crime	154
7. Conclusion	158

D. Aiding, Abetting or otherwise assisting in the ambit of the International Criminal Court **161**

I. Overview over Article 25 Rome Statute	161
II. Article 25(3) Rome Statute	162
1. The model of participation in Article 25(3) Rome Statute	162
2. The distinction between co-perpetration and secondary liability	166
3. Subparagraph (b) as a variation of abetting?	172
4. Aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting pursuant to subparagraph (c)	173
4.1. “aids, abets or otherwise assists, including providing the means for its commission”	173
4.2. “in its commission or its attempted commission”	174
4.3. “for the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime”	175
4.3.1. An elevated <i>mens rea</i> standard	175
4.3.2. Origin of the wording	178
4.3.3. Implications of a <i>dolus directus</i> in the 1 st degree interpretation	179
4.3.4. Alternative interpretations	181

4.3.5. Compatibility of the <i>certain knowledge</i> -standard with the MPC	184
4.3.6. Conclusion	186
4.4. A substantial effect requirement?	187
4.5. Aiding and abetting by act or omission	191
4.5.1. Aiding and abetting by act	191
4.5.2. Aiding and abetting by omission	193
5. Subparagraph (d) as a residual form of assistance	197
III. Article 28: Command responsibility as a form of assistance?	199
1. Failure to punish	199
2. Failure to prevent	202
2.1. Similarity to forms of assistance	202
2.2. Concurrence	204
2.2.1. The practice of the <i>ad hoc</i> tribunals	204
2.2.2. The preferable stance for the ICC	207
3. Conclusion on Article 28	208
E. General conclusion	211
I. Scope of the conclusion	211
II. A normative comparison between the pertinent legal regimes	212
1. Ancillary contributions revisited	212
2. The model of participation	216
3. Prosecutorial discretion and procedural thresholds	217