

Campaign Strategy in Direct Democracy

Laurent Bernhard

*Post-Doctoral Researcher, NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland,
and University of Berne, Berne, Switzerland*

palgrave
macmillan

Contents

<i>List of Tables and Figures</i>	vi
<i>List of Abbreviations and Acronyms</i>	x
1 Introduction	1
2 Theoretical Framework	18
3 The Strategic Context	31
4 The Profiles of the Campaigns	68
5 Coalition Formation	102
6 Message Development	124
7 Message Delivery	151
8 Power Analysis	176
9 Conclusion	199
<i>Appendices</i>	214
<i>Notes</i>	231
<i>References</i>	241
<i>Index</i>	253

Tables and Figures

Tables

1.1	Overview of studies about direct-democratic campaigning	5
1.2	Overview of the selected campaigns	13
1.3	The distribution of selected actors (in percentages), by actor types and campaign	16
2.1	Classification of messages	25
3.1	Typology of direct-democratic institutions	33
3.2	Previous votes in the domain of immigration (1980–2006)	42
3.3	Previous votes in the domain of health politics (1980–2006)	50
3.4	Previous votes in the domains of welfare state issues and labour market regulation (1980–2006)	56
3.5	Previous votes in the domain of economic liberalizations (1980–2006)	62
4.1	Used resources, by camp and campaign	97
4.2	Support for the ballot proposition at three stages	99
5.1	Coalition types, based on shared beliefs	109
5.2	The component coalitions at the level of the 4-blocks-solutions, by campaign	115
6.1	Expected main message, by campaign and coalition	131
6.2	Message selection in the asylum campaign, by camp and block	137
6.3	Message selection in the naturalization campaign, by camp and block	138
6.4	Message selection in the healthcare article campaign, by camp and block	139
6.5	Message selection in the single health insurance campaign, by camp and block	141
6.6	Message selection in the disabled insurance campaign, by camp and block	142
6.7	Message selection in the pension campaign, by camp and block	143

6.8	Message selection in the corporate tax campaign, by camp and block	144
6.9	Message selection in the right to sue campaign, by camp and block	145
6.10	Campaign tone, by camp and campaign	146
6.11	Ordered probit models explaining the extent of negative campaigning, by campaign	148
7.1	The contextual conditions of cantonal targeting strategies in the eight selected campaigns	156
7.2	Cantonal targeting plan in the campaign on pensions	157
7.3	The use of communication activities, by communication channel and campaign	159
7.4	The proportion of interviewed organizations that report to focus on a given constituency, by camp affiliation and campaign, in percentages	162
7.5	Probit regression models explaining the targeting of swing voters, by campaign	163
7.6	Ordered probit regression models explaining the use of the direct media channel, by campaign	167
7.7	Ordered probit regression models explaining the use of the indirect media channel, by campaign	168
7.8	Ordered probit regression models explaining the use of the direct organizational channel, by campaign	169
7.9	Ordered probit regression models explaining the use of the indirect organizational channel, by campaign	170
7.10	Time interval (in days) between the campaign start and the ballot date, by actors and campaigns	172
7.11	OLS regression models explaining the launching of the campaign, by campaign	173
8.1	The ten most powerful actors of the asylum campaign	181
8.2	The ten most powerful actors of the naturalization campaign	182
8.3	The ten most powerful actors of the healthcare article campaign	182
8.4	The ten most powerful actors of the single health insurance campaign	183
8.5	The ten most powerful actors of the disabled insurance campaign	183
8.6	The ten most powerful actors of the old-age pension campaign	184

8.7	The ten most powerful actors of the corporate tax campaign	184
8.8	The ten most powerful actors of the right to sue campaign	185
8.9	OLS regression models explaining the actors' standardized power levels, by campaign	193
8.10	Correlation coefficients between residuals and power levels, by campaign	196
B.1	Overview of the actors involved in the asylum law campaign, by block	218
B.2	Overview of the actors involved in the naturalization campaign, by block	220
B.3	Overview of the actors involved in the health article campaign, by block	221
B.4	Overview of the actors involved in the single health insurance campaign, by block	222
B.5	Overview of the actors involved in the disabled insurance campaign, by block	223
B.6	Overview of the actors involved in the pensions campaign, by block	225
B.7	Overview of the actors involved in the corporate tax campaign, by block	226
B.8	Overview of the actors involved in the right to sue campaign, by block	227
C.1	The selected items of issue ownership, by campaign and block	229

Figures

2.1	Correlation between the expected outcome and the proportion of victory-seeking organizations	20
2.2	The two opposing camps and their corresponding component coalitions	24
2.3	Targeting of constituencies	26
2.4	Four communication channels	27
5.1	Beliefs in the asylum law campaign, by component coalition	116
5.2	Beliefs in the naturalization campaign, by component coalition	117
5.3	Beliefs in the single health insurance campaign, by component coalition	119

5.4	Beliefs in the disabled insurance campaign, by component coalition	120
5.5	Beliefs in the campaign on old-age pensions, by component coalition	120
5.6	Beliefs in the corporate tax campaign, by component coalition	121
5.7	Beliefs in the right to sue initiative campaign, by component coalition	121
5.8	Beliefs in the campaign on the healthcare article, by component coalition	122
A.1	The first three splits by CONCOR in the case of the asylum law	214
A.2	The first three splits by CONCOR in the case of the naturalization initiative (adjusted)	214
A.3	The first three splits by CONCOR in the case of the healthcare article	215
A.4	The first three splits by CONCOR in the case of the single health insurance	215
A.5	The first three splits by CONCOR in the case of the disabled insurance reform	216
A.6	The first three splits by CONCOR in the case of pensions	216
A.7	The first three splits by CONCOR in the case of the corporate tax reform	217
A.8	The first three splits by CONCOR in the case of the right to sue initiative	217